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Re: security and journaling

To: Ray Muno <muno@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: security and journaling
From: Steve Lord <lord@xxxxxxx>
Date: 30 Sep 2002 14:29:27 -0500
Cc: linux-xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20020930191821.GO15322@xxxxxxxxxxx>
References: <1033412016.12588.12.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> <20020930185617.GA15397@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> <20020930151013.F24367@xxxxxxxxxxx> <20020930191821.GO15322@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Sender: linux-xfs-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxx
On Mon, 2002-09-30 at 14:18, Ray Muno wrote:
> SHRED(1)                       FSF                       SHRED(1)
>        shred  -  delete  a file securely, first overwriting it to
>        hide its contents
>        shred [OPTIONS] FILE [...]
> ...stuff deleted
>        CAUTION:  Note  that  shred  relies  on  a  very important
>        assumption: that the filesystem overwrites data in  place.
>        This  is the traditional way to do things, but many modern
>        filesystem designs do not satisfy  this  assumption.   The
>        following  are  examples  of filesystems on which shred is
>        not effective:
>        * log-structured or journaled filesystems, such  as  those
>        supplied with
>               AIX and Solaris (and JFS, ReiserFS, XFS, etc.)

If shred just overwrites in place it will be effective with XFS,
that man page is wrong.



Steve Lord                                      voice: +1-651-683-3511
Principal Engineer, Filesystem Software         email: lord@xxxxxxx

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